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FROM LOVERCAMP TO A PRISONER'S RIGHT TO
ESCAPE: AN INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION?*
INTRODUCTION

n a 1975 law review article,' Professor Martin R. Gardner analyzed the California Court of Appeal's decision in People v.
Lovercamp.2 The court held that a prisoner who escapes under
threats of violent sexual assault can raise a defense of "necessity."
Professor Gardner argued that this holding creates a right to escape
for prisoners who are subjected to violent sexual assaults while
incarcerated. Ultimately, the establishment of this right would
lead to its use in habeas corpus proceedings brought by inmates
to secure their release from incarceration when their personal security could not be guaranteed by the state.3 Thus, prisoners could
demand either definite improvement by the state in providing for
their security or their release from confinement.
One may be in sympathy with the commendable end Professor Gardner hopes to attain and still be troubled by the means
he has chosen to reach it, namely, the novel step of asserting that
the inmate has a right to escape. The purpose of this Comment
is to offer a brief critique of Professor Gardner's ingenious and
complex interpretation of Lovercamp. Particular emphasis will be
placed on his use of Hohfeld's analysis of jural relationships.4
* The author is indebted to Professors James B. Brady and Thomas D. Perry of
the Philosophy Department of the State University of New York at Buffalo for their insightful criticisms of this paper.
1. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from Prison-A Step
Towards IncarcerationFree from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 110 (1975).
2. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (4th Dist. 1974).
3. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 144-52.
4. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was concerned with the confusion of fundamental
legal concepts which resulted from inadequate and ambiguous legal terminology. This

confusion of concepts would lead to the oversimplifying of complex legal problems and
the overlooking of vital distinctions which, in turn, could produce erroneous resolutions
of concrete legal questions. The broad and indiscriminate use in legal discourse of the
term "right" so as to include privileges, powers, and immunities was a clear manifestation of a misguiding ambiguity. Hohfeld responded to this ambiguity with a precise
analysis of the fundamental legal concepts. According to Hohfeld, "right" in the strict
sense refers to one's affirmative claim against another person. It is to be distinguished
from the other fundamental concepts, most notably "privilege," which refers to one's
freedom from the claim of another.
Hohfeld asserted that the fundamental legal concepts are sui generis and, therefore, are inappropriate terms for formal definition. He felt that the development of a
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I. PEOPLE V. LOVERCAMP

Marsha Lovercamp and another female inmate were confined
in a state institution for the detention and treatment of drug
addicts. Throughout their confinement they were threatened by
a group of lesbian inmates who demanded their participation in
sexual acts. Complaints to prison authorities were unavailing. On
the day of the escape, they were again threatened by a group of
ten or fifteen lesbian inmates and a fight ensued. Ms. Lovercamp
was informed, after the fight, that she would "see the group again."
The defendant and the other inmate feared for their lives and
fled the institution. They were promptly recaptured a short distance away. Ms. Lovercamp sought to introduce evidence of this
sexual intimidation at her trial for escape. The offer of proof was

scheme of "opposites" and "correlatives" for each of the eight fundamental concepts
would facilitate an understanding of these concepts and of the distinctions among them.
Hohfeld illustrated this scheme in the following table (read downward for the relations):
immunity
power
privilege
right
Jural Opposites:

Jural Correlatives:

no-right

duty

disability

liability

right

privilege

power

immunity

duty

no-right

liability

disability

W. N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 26,
35-64 (1964 ed.) [hereinafter cited as HOHFELD].
Professor Glanville Williams has pointed out an inadequacy in Hohfeld's scheme of
rights and privileges and their respective correlatives. He maintains that for the scheme
to be complete a distinction must be made between rights of positive content (obliging
someone to act in a certain way) and rights of negative content (obliging someone to

forbear from acting in a certain way). Thus the portion of the above table referring to
rights and privileges should be expanded to include Williams' distinction as follows:
Jural Opposites:
Positive Content
privilege not
right
duty
no-right
Negative Content
right ...

not

no-right ...not
Jural Correlatives:
Positive Content
right
duty
Negative Content
right ...

duty not

not

privilege

duty not

privilege not
no-right
privilege

no-right.., not

Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1129, 1135-39

(1956).
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refused by the trial judge. Subsequently, Ms. Lovercamp was convicted of the crime of escape.5
The court of appeal reversed the conviction, holding that the
trial court had erred in rejecting the defendant's offer of proof
and that a "limited" defense of necessity is available to such a
defendant when certain conditions are present.6 This limited defense was found to be the proper way of balancing the individual
interest of the inmate and the strong public interest against escapesg
in a manner that adequately protects both. The court concluded:
"We have not formulated a new rule of law but rather have applied rules long ago established in a manner which effects fundamental justice." 8
II. PROFESSOR GARDNER'S ARGUMENT

Professor Gardner's argument in support of the right to escape
can be briefly analyzed as follows:
(1) The defense of necessity rests upon the "choice-of-thelesser-evil" rationale. When a person, because of pressures from
his surrounding environment, is forced to choose between violating the literal requirements of the law or complying with the law
5. CAL. WELFARE & INsTrrUTiONS CODE § 3002 (West 1972): "Every person committed pursuant to this chapter or former Chapter II . .. of Title 7 of the Penal Code
who escapes or attempts to escape from lawful custody is guilty of a crime." Once the

offer of proof was refused, the defendant was convicted more or less as a matter of course,
since she did not deny committing the act of leaving custody with the general intent to
leave (the elements constituting the crime).
6.

[W]e hold that the proper rule is that a limited defense of necessity is available
if the following conditions exist:
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual

attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory;
(3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison per-

sonnel or other "innocent" persons in the escape; and
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when

he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.
43 Cal App. 3d at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (1974) (footnote omitted).
7. Such public interests include a need to prevent disruption of prison order and
discipline, a concern about the danger to guards, police and prisoners resulting from
escape attempts, and a desire to prevent the widespread public alarm that is occasioned
by escapes. See State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 310, 72 A.2d 442, 444 (1950).
8. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (1974). The court later reiterated
that feeling: "We do not conceive that we have created a new defense to an escape charge.
We merely recognize, as did an English Court 238 years ago, that some conditions 'excuseth the felony.'" Id. at 833, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 116 (1974).
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and producing harm greater than the harm done by violating the
law, in order to maximize social utility (which requires that the
lesser evil be chosen), the person will have a defense against prosecution for the violation under the doctrine of necessity. This defense is generally viewed as justificatoryY
(2) Criminal defenses grounded on the concept of justification negative the actus reus element of criminal responsibility.10
(3) Therefore, necessity negates the actus reus of the crime.
Turning to Lovercamp, Gardner asserts:
(4) Courts have the power to change, reaffirm or create new
legal relationships by their decisions.
(5) The Lovercamp court created a new rule that has changed
the legal relationship between the inmate and the state: under
certain limited conditions (those allowing for the applicability of
the necessity defense"") an inmate can leave confinement with
impunity.
(6) The critical issue then becomes: What is the extent of
this change in the legal relationship? Gardner distinguishes between privileges and rights which result from a court's exercise
of its power. The importance of this distinction and of whether
Lovercamp supports a privilege only or also a right is better understood through the use of Hohfeldian analysis of rights, privileges and their correlatives. 2 If only a privilege has been created,
then when the Lovercamp conditions are present one has no duty
not to escape. However, this does not determine whether the inmate can be prevented from exercising this privilege or whether
she subsequently can be reconfined in the same institution and
serve the remainder of her original sentence. On the other hand,
Professor Gardner argues that if a right to escape is created, then
the state has a duty not to interfere with the inmate's exercise of
her right. Non-interference would obligate the state not to con9. Gardner, supra note 1, at 118.
10. Gardner, supra note 1, at 116. This principle can be illustrated by considering
the justificatory defense of self-defense. The mens rea element of what would otherwise
be a crime remains unaffected by the defense since the retaliating victim does have the
intent to harm. When the requirements for the defense are met, however, the victim's
retaliatory attack on the aggressor is no longer considered wrongful conduct. In other
words, the actus reus is negated.
11. See note 6 supra.
12. See note 4 supra.
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fine a prisoner in a setting in which she faces imminent threats
of sexual assault, that is, when the right to escape exists. Finally,
if a right to escape exists, then a remedy must be available for
its violation. The remedy would be release from confinement
when the state cannot meet its duty to confine free from sexual
assaults.
(7) There are four bases or rationales that support the existence of the right to escape:
(a) Professor Gardner's primary argument for the existence
of the right relates to the workings of the justificatory defense
presented in paragraphs (1)-(3):
While Lovercamp clearly establishes the privilege of escape
under specified conditions, the logic of the decision also entails
the stronger interest of an inmate right to escape. Because escapes

under the Lovercamp conditions are "justified," it follows that
confinement in prison environments
creating that particular choice
13

of evils situation is unlawful.
This assertion is explicated as follows: Escapes under the Lovercamp conditions are justified under the necessity doctrine. Justificatory defenses negate the actus reus of the crime. The crime of
escape involves the intentional leaving of lawful custody. Since
in Lovercamp situations there is no actus reus, the custody is not
lawful. Therefore, such an inmate has no duty to remain in the
conditions of his prior confinement and the state has no right to
prevent escapes nor has it a right to continue a confinement that
would justify escape.
(b) Further support for the establishment of the right emanates from the "general doctrine that it is unlawful for third persons to defend against, or prevent justified acts." 14 Since the
escape is justified and not unlawful, guards may not legally prevent it, and the state cannot subsequently confine in the same
situation. Without special protection such a further confinement
would be unlawful, especially where there is a great possibility of
retaliation against the inmate for any "snitching" he may have
done to authorities to prove that his escape was justified. 5
13. Gardner, supra note 1, at 139 (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 140 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 135.
15. For the dangers incurred by "snitching" or "breaking the prison code,"see
justice Seiler's dissenting opinion in State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), and
Note, Sexual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationships in Prison: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 ALBANY L. Ra v.428, 433-34 (1972).
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(c) If a prisoner is prevented by the state from justifiably
escaping, he is denied his right to confinement free from sexual
assault.
(d) Finally, Professor Gardner notes that various policy considerations support the view that Lovercamp implies the right to
escape. The inmate's interests are recognized under conceptions
of "civilized" treatment and fundamental justice. These interests
require judicially enforceable remedies to insure confinement free
from sexual assaults. These remedies necessitate not only shortterm self-help (the privilege), but also the long-term aid that the
right to escape will afford. If a humane society cannot countenance
such conditions in a penal system, then the court has the responsibility to recognize the right to escape in such situations and to
provide remedies for violations. Further, competing interests of
the state are not injured, since those interests extend only to lawful imprisonment consistent with the purpose of the criminal
sanction. 16
In sum, Professor Gardner concludes that Lovercamp implies
a right to escape.1 7 The remainder of this Comment will critically
examine whether such an inference is warranted. More specifically,
Lovercamp and the rationales of paragraph (7) above will be analyzed in greater detail to determine if one justifiably could condude that there is a "right to escape."
III. A

CRITICISM OF PROFESSOR GARDNER'S ARGUMENT

The situation before the court in Lovercamp involved a number of Hohfeldian correlatives. A listing of these correlatives, along
16. Confinement without protection from sexual assault, as indicated in paragraph
7 (a), is unlawful and is not consistent with the purpose of the criminal sanction, whether
rehabilitation or retribution is the preferred rationale. Gardner, supra note I, at 143.
17. It is apparent from even a cursory examination of his article that Professor
Gardner is also attempting to say a good deal about the distinction between the defense
of necessity and the defense of duress as they relate to Lovercamp and the argument for
the right to escape. At best, his discussion of the distinction is unrelated to the main
argument. At worst, he posits a difference in kind where one does not exist. It makes no
difference to his argument if duress is found to be a subclass of necessity that, purely by
historical accident, has been relegated to cases of threats from human rather than physical forces. Viewed this way, duress also would be a justificatory defense. Professor Gardner
himself vacillates as to the significance of the distinction. At one point, he attests to its
importance. Gardner, supra note 1, at 131 n.117. Later, he avows that the distinction is
not of great consequence, the pertinent issue being whether the defense sounds in justification. Id. at 133. Accordingly, this Comment will refer to the defense as necessity, recognizing, however, that whichever term a court may choose to utilize, if it is taken to
justify conduct and to be based on the choice-of-the-lesser-evil rationale, it is applicable
to Professor Gardner's scheme.
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with some commentary to clarify their meanings, is necessary to
analyze critically Gardner's argument. This list will not exhaust
the various relationships that may exist between the inmate and
the state. Rather, it will contain correlatives particularly relevant
to the issue addressed in Lovercamp and will serve as the basis
for appraising additional correlative pairings and analogies as the
analysis progresses. Finally, this section will examine each rationale
catalogued in paragraph (7) of Part II to determine the soundness
of Gardner's conclusion.
A. The Hohfeldian Correlatives
1. Right/duty relations:
Right of state that the defendant not escape from lawful confinement.
Duty of defendant not to escape from lawful confinement.
This relationship is derived from the California Welfare and
Institutions Code's escape provision, 8 which creates a duty on the
part of the defendant not to escape from lawful confinement. The
concept of legal duty can be described as a societal compulsion
upon one to act or not to act for the benefit of another. Its basis
is in laws that are by nature coercive. 19 Its correlative, "right,"
signifies one's affirmative claim against another regarding the ac20
tion of that other person.
The establishment of a duty generally is sufficient to establish
the existence of a correlative right, in that the relation of the concepts is an expression of a single, uniform idea:
Any given single relation necessarily involves two persons. Correlatives in Hohfeld's scheme merely describe the situation viewed
first from the point of view of one person and then from that of
the other. Each concept must, therefore, as a matter of logic, have
21

a correlative.

18.

See note 5 supra.

Corbin, Forward to W. N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APL REASONING at ix (1964 ed.).
20. Cook, Introduction-Hohfeld's Contribution to the Science of Law, in W. N.
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 7 (1964
ed.) [hereinafter cited as Cook].
21. Id. at 10. See also Corbin, supra note 19, at ix; Brady, Law, Language, and
19.

PLIED IN JUDIc

Logic: The Legal Philosophy of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 8 TRANSACTIONS OP THE
CHARLES S. PIERCE Soc'Y 246, 248 (1972) (referring to the correlative concepts as equivalents).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

Some legal philosophers, however, declare that there are no
rights in individuals correlative to the obligations imposed by the
criminal law.2 2 They maintain that the test for the existence of a
right correlative to an obligation is the control that an individual,
whether or not a beneficiary of the obligation, 8 has over the
obligation:
The idea is that of one individual being given by the law exclusive control, more or less extensive, over another person's duty so
that in the area of conduct covered by that duty the individual
who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is
owed. The fullest measure of control comprises three distinguishable elements: (i) the right holder may waive or extinguish the
duty or leave it in existence; (ii) after breach or threatened breach
of a duty he may leave it "unenforced" or may "enforce" it by
suing for compensation or, in certain cases, for an injunction or
mandatory order to restrain the continued or further breach of
duty; and (iii) he may waive or extinguish the obligation to pay
24
compensation to which the breach gives rise.

While the civil law recognizes such control on the part of individuals, the criminal law does not.25 There is, therefore, a distinction between duties from legal rules designed to prohibit conduct
and duties from legal rules designed to create rights, 20 with only
the latter conferring correlative rights.
While the "control" theory suggests the concept of legal
power and, therefore, may tend to obfuscate a discussion of the
right/duty relation, 27 it would not appear to exclude a right in22.

See H. L. A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-

DENcE 171, 191-93 (2d ser., A. W. B. Simpson ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart];
Marshall, Rights, Options, and Entitlements, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 228, 236
(2d ser., A. W. B. Simpson ed. 1973).
23. This is opposed to the "benefit" theory expounded by Bentham, whereby the
concept of a right correlative to a duty was defined in terms of the intended beneficiary
of the obligation. Those adhering to the "control" or "choice" theory assert that benefit
from the obligation is neither sufficient nor necessary for the existence of a right correlative to the duty. Hart, supra note 22, at 196.
24. Id. at 192. See also Marshall, supra note 22, at 235.
25. See Hart, supra note 22, at 191-93; Marshall, supra note 22, at 236. Courts recognize this lack of control as a lack of standing to contest the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
26. Marshall, supra note 22, at 236.'
27. It is not clear whether the "control" or "choice" theory deprecates the attestations of Hohfeld and others (see note 19 supra) that logic demands that each concept
have a correlative, or whether it does not attack the right/duty relation as such but
rather contends that: (1) the true right/duty relation is between the state and individuals
as duty-holders-there are no obligations to individuals and only the state, a collective
whole, can suffer injury with respect to breaches of the criminal law; or (2) while the

RIGHT TO ESCAPE

herent in a "large-scale sovereign" such as the state. Indeed, the
state places the duty on the inmate; he owes the duty to the state,
and the state has control over the enforcement of the duty through
its various agents (police, prosecutors and the courts) .28 Litigation
concerning the existence of the defendant's duty will also concern the propriety of the state's claim that the defendant refrain
from acting in a certain way.
Further clarity is added to Hohfeld's concept of "right" by
inquiring into the character of that concept. Bentham categorized
rights as either claims for negative services, that is, another's abstaining from harmful action towards the right-holder, or claims
for positive services, that is, useful action to be performed by another for the right-holder.2 Accordingly, the above right of the
state is one for negative service.
Right of the inmate that the state reasonably provide for his
security.
Duty of the state reasonably to provide for inmate security.
While at one time the state's obligations to a prisoner were
thought to be minimal, 0 both statutory law3 ' and case law3 2 indiindividual may, strictly, have a right correlative to an obligation imposed by the criminal
law, it is virtually naked and meaningless, since the powers necessary to enforce it are
under the control of the state. As such, it may be better to speak of a citizen's duty to
the state not to do X to another citizen, instead of a citizen's duty not to do X to another citizen, where X equals a crime.
28. Professor Gardner refers to the state as the "other party to the controversy."

Gardner, supra note 1, at 185.
29. J. BENT-Am , Of Laws in General, in COLLFItOED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAm
58-59 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BENTHAM]. See also Hart, supra note 22, at 176-77.
Professor Williams refers to these as "rights of negative content" and "rights of positive
content." Williams, supra note 4, at 1135.
30. "[The convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited
his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords
to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State." Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.
(21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2652 (West 1970) (making it "unlawful to . . . allow any
lack of care whatever which would injure or impair the health of a prisoner. . . .'), and
id. § 2653 (making it punishable to be "guilty of wilful inhumanity . . . toward any
prisoner in a state prison). See also N. Y. CoRRction Aw § 46 (McKinney 1968) (requiring state commissioner of correction to protect and preserve the health of the inmate) ;
18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970) (requiring prison administrators to provide for the safekeeping,
care, subsistence, and protection of all federal prisoners).
32.
Indeed, the State has a duty to assure inmate safety ...
. The persons
in charge of our prisons . . . are obliged to take reasonable precautions in
order to provide a place of confinement where a prisoner is safe from gang
rapes and beatings by fellow inmates, safe from guard ignorance of pleas for
help and safe from intentional placement into situations where an assault of
one type or another is likely to result.
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cate that at present the state is obliged to take reasonable steps
to insure a prisoner's safety and well-being. The correlative right
3 and his claim against
of the inmate is one of positive contentO
the state or prison officials would be a classic example of liability
based on a failure to perform a service for which there was a legal
duty to perform imposed by law. 4 While widespread success in
litigating the inmate's claim for the violation of the duty to protect has not been forthcoming, the claim would be fortified if
the inmate could show a violation of constitutional prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment 5 The "hands-off" doctrine
would be abandoned, 36 and release from confinement would be a
possible remedy. However, prevailing on this constitutional issue
may be problematic, particularly when a single, specific right (for
example, the right to protection from sexual assault while imprisoned) is asserted, rather than a "totality of deplorable cir-

cumstances.

37

A great deal of caution must be exercised to guard against
confusing the separate relations in situations where more than one
correlative set exists. For example, in People ex rel. Brown v.
People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 483-84, 220 N.W.2d 212, 213 (1974), afl'd, 394
Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975) (citation omitted), cited with approval in Lovercamp,
43 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15 (1974). Cf. Woodhous v. Virginia, 487
F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) ("A prisoner has a right, secured by the
eighth and fourteenth amendments, to be reasonably protected from constant threat of
violence and sexual assault by his fellow inmates.').
33. See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
34. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955): "Liability
for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by
action unless . . . (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."
35. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 111-12.
36. The courts have rejected this doctrine where such a policy of judicial restraint
would result in a failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims, including
allegations of eighth amendment violations. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
405-06 (1974); Martinez v. Marcusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1971). But see Kimbal & Newman, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions:

Threat and Response, 14 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1,4 (1968).
37. Professor Gardner states: "[N]o case has specifically held that the inmate has
a constitutional right to be free from homosexual assault." Gardner, supra note 1, at 112.
Instead, such assaults are merely part of a totality of deplorable circumstances which
have led courts to declare incarceration in some prisons to be cruel and unusual punishment. See cases cited id. n.9. But see Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam) (holding that confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign is
cruel and unusual punishment even if the particular inmate does not fear imminent
sexual assault); Rubin, Introduction-Symposium: A Model Act for the Protection of
Rights of Prisoners,1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 551, 555 (section 2 of the Model Act reads: "Tie
prevalence of homosexual assaults in all institutions . . .is a notorious violation of constitutional rights.').
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Johnston,8 the New York Court of Appeals stated that a "state's
right to detain a person is entitled to no greater application than its
correlative duty to protect him from unlawful and onerous treatment." ' There are two distinct sets of correlatives at work in the
statement: the right of the state that the inmate not escape/duty
of the inmate not to escape, and the right of the inmate that the
state reasonably protect him from unlawful and onerous treatment/duty of the state to protect the inmate from unlawful and
onerous treatment. If such a remark is interpreted as involving
only one set (the right of the state to detain/duty of the state to
protect), the remark is obviously fallacious, since the right and
duty may not attach to the same party in any single correlative
pairing. But once the two separate correlative pairings are correctly identified, the policy judgment that must then be madewhether the state's right to incarcerate should be limited by its
duty to protect-is dearly exposed.
Right of the state to have prison officials prevent inmates from
escaping from lawful confinement.
Duty of prison officials to prevent inmates from escaping from lawful confinement

Concomitant to the state's right that an inmate not escape
from lawful confinement is a duty imposed on the responsible
officials to prevent escapes. Indeed, failure to fulfill this obligation may result in severe sanctions. 40
2. Privilege/no-rightrelation:
Privilege41 of the responsible state officials to prevent inmates

from escaping from lawful confinement.
No-right of defendant that responsible officials not prevent his
escape from lawful confinement.
38.
39.
40.
guard to

9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N-E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
Id. at 485, 174 N.E.2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4533 (West 1970) (subjecting a prison warden, jailor or
up to 10 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for voluntarily permitting the

escape of any prisoner in custody).
41. This Comment will retain the terminology of Hohfeld in preference to the other
term in popular use, "liberty." As Professor Williams indicates, both "privilege" and
"liberty" present difficulties in their application. The former often cannot be detached
from the common conception that it refers to a special favor (one not available to
everyone) -which surely is not a correct description of the concept. The latter is frequently used to connote the philosophical idea of "free choice," rather than "the opposite
of duty." See Williams, supra note 4, at 1131-32, 1139-49. Therefore, until their meanings
as legal terms of art are firmly established, there may be confusion in using either term.
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Since officials have a duty to prevent escapes, it follows that
they are also privileged to prevent escapes; that is, they may act
to stop the inmate and may return her to confinement.4 2 The inmate's correlative no-right means that she has no claim against
these officials. Furthermore, the privilege is a "unilateral" one,
that is, one occasioned by the liberty to do an act plus a duty
to do the act, which, in turn, eliminates a privilege not to do
the act.4"
3. Power/liabilityrelation:
Power of the court to change the existing legal relationship between the state and the inmate regarding the availability of an
affirmative defense for escape prosecutions.
Liability of the state and the inmate that the court will change
the existing legal relationship between them as regards the availability of an affirmative defense.
Ithas been said that "[the courts have] a power when a change
in legal relations may take place due to 'some superadded fact or
groups of facts' which are under [the court's] 'volitional control.' , Lovercamp illustrates this concept. The California Court
of Appeal utilized its power to determine the nature of the legal
relationship between the state and the inmate where the interplay
of the relevant duties and privileges was uncertain: 4 the defendant
was obliged under the escape statute not to escape. Affirmative defenses like necessity, if established, would justify criminal conduct; however, the courts had also recognized the general rule that
intolerable conditions of confinement do not justify escape. 40 The

42. What is obligatory is also privileged. See Hart, supra note 22, at 175-76; Brady,

supra note 21, at 248.
43. See Hart, supra note 22, at 182. A privilege is bilateral when the privilegeholder may either do an act (no duty not to do the act) or not do that same act (no
duty to do the act). A bilateral privilege becomes unilateral when a duty is imposed
upon the privilege-holder either to do the act or not to do the act, thereby destroying
his choice. For a privilege and a duty to be compatible they must be of similar content
and not of opposite tenor. Id.; Williams, supra note 4, at 1131. The guards' privilege to
prevent escapes and their duty to prevent escapes are compatible and their combination
results in a unilateral privilege.
44. Brady, supra note 21, at 252.

45. Bentham referred to these as "blanks" in the law or as "imperfect mandates"
which are left to the power-holders to "fill up." Hart, supra, note 22 at 179.

46. See the discussion of the previously existing law in People v. Lovercamp, 43
Cal. App. 3d 823, 826-27, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (1974) See also State v. Palmer, 45 Del.
308, 310, 72 A.2d 442, 444 (1950).
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court resolved the uncertainty regarding the legal relation by establishing a privilege to escape4r:
Privilege of defendant to escape from lawful confinement under
specified conditions.

No-right of the state that defendant not escape from lawful confinement under specified conditions.
By declaring that its limited "defense of necessity to an escape
charge is a viable defense,"4 8 the Lovercamp court countermanded 49
the duty otherwise imposed upon the defendant by the conjunction of the escape statute and the rule that intolerable conditions
do not justify prison escape. The court's decision means that the
defendant is under no duty not to escape where the proper conditions are present.6 Thus, this privilege to escape 51 is a negation of
a duty of negative content. These two negatives perform logically
separate functions and, accordingly, "no duty not to escape" cannot be reduced to "duty to escape." 52 Therefore, the court did
not formulate a unilateral privilege such as the guards' privilege
to prevent escapes.53 Professor Gardner may be asserting that a
duty to escape exists, at least as a moral principle, when he speaks
of the moral obligation to choose the lesser of two evils.54 However, it is by no means clear that there is a legal obligation to
choose the lesser of two evils as well as no duty not to make such
a choice. For example, does a man violate the criminal law by
stopping for red lights when, because his wife is close to giving
birth, he would be justified in running them?
47. This was an exercise of power even though itself subject to the legislature's
power to adjust the relationship in the Penal Code. In addition, Lovercamp is an excel-

lent illustration that Hohfeldian "liabilities" are not necessarily disadvantageous, in that

the court's exercise of power created an advantageous privilege for Ms. Lovercamp.
48. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
49. Bentham categorized legal rules that permit some action previously legally prohibited or obligatory as rules of "active permission" which "countermand." BENTHAM,
supra note 29, at 57-58. See also Hart, supra note 22, at 174.
50. See note 6 supra.
51. It does not speak of the privilege not to escape. Since one always has a privilege
to do what she has a duty to do, this latter privilege always existed under the coercive
law. The defendant has, strictly speaking, a "bilateral" privilege. This privilege to do
what one is obliged to do is often, however, a liberty to do a disadvantageous thing and
is of little importance in the criminal law. As such, it seems linguistically odd, if not
incorrect, to talk of the "privilege to pay taxes" or the "liberty not to escape." See

Williams, supra note 4, at 1139; Hart, supra note 22, at 176, 182.
52.
53.
54.

See Williams, supra note 4, at 1136.
See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
Gardner, supra note 1, at 140.
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The state's correlative no-right precludes the possibility of a
contention that the defendant breached a legal obligation by escaping under these circumstances.
Right of inmate that state not interfere with his exercise of his
privilege to escape under the specified conditions.
Duty of state not to interfere with the inmate's exercise of his
privilege to escape under the specified conditions.
Professor Gardner maintains that this relationship, dealing
with the right to escape, emanates from Lovercamp. It is this additional relationship that forms the basis of the disagreement between this author and Professor Gardner.
B. Critique
The "right to escape" is a misnomer:
No one ever has a right to do something; he only has a right that
someone else shall do (or refrain from doing) something. In other
words, every right in the strict sense relates to the conduct of another, while a liberty and a power relate to the conduct of the
holder of the liberty or power. A statement that a person has a
right to do something generally means that he has a right in the
5
strict sense not to be interfered with in doing it.

In order to avoid confusion and the possibility of making fallacious statements concerning rights "in the broad sense," one
must meticulously and correctly describe the various Hohfeldian
relations. The concept that Professor Gardner seeks to assert is
more precisely described as the inmate's right that the state not
interfere with the exercise of the privilege to escape under the
specified conditions, rather than by the phrase "right to escape."
Furthermore, the former expression permits an easier formulation
of the state's correlative duty so that one can understand its negative content and when this duty is to be performed.
The fundamental error that Professor Gardner makes in viewing Lovercamp as establishing a "right to escape" is his contention that the decision establishes a privilege that entails a right
to escape. 6 Privileges involve protection given to the privilege55. Williams, supra note 4, at 1145 (emphasis added). See also Marshall, supra
note 22, at 240 (characterizing liberty as a "right of action," and claim-right as a "right
of recipience').
56. Gardner, supra note 1, at 139.
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holder in the form of a refusal of legal redress when asked for by
the person against whom the privilege is asserted; rights are the
claims of the right-holder against another, vindicated by affirmative
action of a court.57 Lovercamp involved a refusal of legal redress
to the state for a breach of the criminal law by granting the limited defense of necessity to the defendant-a privilege to escape
under specified conditions. The court did not, however, take any
affirmative action regarding the state's conduct toward a prisoner
making a privileged escape. A right that the state not interfere
was not litigated in Lovercamp.
Can the right emerge from the privilege? First, the duty of
the guards to prevent escapes from lawful confinement and their
concomitant privilege to do so are not destroyed by the privilege
afforded in Lovercamp: "[When it is said that a given privilege
is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty
having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege
in question."5 8" The duty precisely opposite to the inmate's privilege
established in Lovercamp is the duty of the prisoner not to escape
from confinement under specified conditions. Consequently,
though the privilege exists, the inmate still has no right that the
guards not prevent his escape from lawful confinement under the
specified conditions.
Thus, a privilege may exist without the privilege-holder having an accompanying right not to be interfered with in his exercise of the privilege.59 The privilege/no-right correlative set has
legal significance by itself; it is not required to be tied to a right/
duty relation. Therefore, it is fallacious to deduce the latter from
the former. To be sure, there can be a right concomitant to the
privilege, but the existence of such a right is not automatic.
Rather, it "is ultimately a question of justice and policy, and it
should be considered, as such, on its merits." 60 Nowhere in its
decision did the Lovercamp court conceive of an accompanying
right. Nevertheless, Professor Gardner is willing to state:
"Whether or not the court 'purported' to create a new inmate right
57. Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L.J. 779,
789-90 n.27 (1918) [hereinafter cited as Privileges of Labor Unions].
58. Hohfeld, supra note 4, at 39. Compare note 43 supra (a privilege and a duty
of the same tenor are compatible).
59. See HoHFmELD, supra note 4, at 41-43; Brady, supra note 21, at 249-51; Privileges
of Labor Unions, supra note 57, at 787; Hart, supra note 22, at 180; Williams, supra

note 4, at 1143, 1150.
60.

Homiraw, supra note 4, at 43.
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to escape, the logic of Lovercamp has this effect. .

.

. While

Lovercamp clearly establishes the privilege of escape under specified conditions, the logic of the decision also entails the stronger
interest of an inmate right to escape.""1 If the interpretation of
Lovercamp in this Comment is correct, then clearly the only possible correlative logically implied by the decision is a no-right of
the state that the defendant not escape under specified conditions.
Professor Gardner, however, offers four reasons for concluding
that a "ramification" of Lovercamp is the right to escape.' Each
will be dealt with in turn.
1. The offense of escape is intentional leaving of lawful custody. The justificatory defense of Lovercamp negates the actus
reus, making the act lawful. Since the defendant's leaving is lawful,
the custody in that situation is unlawful. Therefore, the state has
no right to prevent escape (opposite of privilege) and no right
to
03
escape.
justify
would
which
confinement
continue unlawful
Professor Gardner performs some linguistic gymnastics with
the term "lawful" in order to establish the source of his right.
However, he errs on a number of fronts.
What purpose is served by utilizing the term "lawful"? "[I]f
we are to be sure of our logic we must adopt and consistently use
a terminology adequate to express the distinctions involved."0 4
The fundamental legal concepts depicted by Hohfeld are considered the " 'lowest common denominators' in terms of which
all legal problems can be stated, and stated so as to bring out
with greater distinctness than would otherwise be possible the
real questions involved." 5 The spirit of this statement is clearly
missed by Professor Gardner when he focuses on the ambiguous
term "lawful." By choosing to speak of lawful conduct, rather
than the privileged conduct permitted by Lovercamp, he has mud61.

Gardner, supra note 1, at 139.

62. In this sense, Professor Gardner may be using the terms "logic" and "entail"
to mean "furnishes a strong basis for arguing or concluding." While legal writers are
not obliged to use words precisely as logicians use them, it would seem fitting that one
utilizing the analytic jurisprudence of Hohfeld make it explicit that he did not intend
strict deductive entailment. Even if one accepts this interpretation, Professor Gardner
must still explain how the privilege serves as a "strong basis" for the existence of the
right without assuming the existence of the right. In other words, he must establish

some operative premise that transforms the privilege from a naked privilege, having legal
significance by itself, to a "strong basis" for a concomitant right.
63. Gardner, supra note 1, at 139-40.

64. Cook, supra note 20, at 6.
65. Id.
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died the waters. Once the ambiguous term is injected, the discussion is linguistically contaminated66 and Gardner can then argue
from the lawfulness of the inmates escape to the lawfulness of his
claim not to be interfered with.
Furthermore, the ambiguous term obfuscates the determination of which concepts are of negative content and which concepts serve to negate them. Accordingly, Professor Gardner overlooks the fact that the privilege of Lovercamp is no duty not to
escape from lawful custody under specified conditions (this being
the negation of the actus reus). Instead, he asserts that because of
the justificatory defense the escape was lawful and, therefore, the
custody was unlawful. This is plainly inapposite; the negation of
the duty of negative content does not go to the matter of the lawfulness of the custody but to the conditions under which a privilege to escape from lawful custody arises. Indeed, the majority
of decisions hold that even if the inmate is illegally confined she
may not escape, but must use the judicial process to determine
the illegality and obtain freedom.
2. It is unlawful to defend against or prevent justified acts.
This destroys the privilege of the guards to prevent escapes under
the specified conditions and, therefore,
seriously compromises
68
their concomitant duty to do so.
This doctrine involves an area of the law which is less than
clear. Professor Gardner refers to self-defense as an example of the
doctrine at work.69
Self-defense can be analyzed as follows:
Victim's (Y's) right that aggressor (A) not assault him. 70
Duty of A not to assault V.
Privilege for V to prevent A's assault. 71
No-right for A that V not prevent the assault.

66. The "principle of linguistic contamination" describes "the tendency . . . to
assume an identity of concepts from the identity of terms." Brady, supra note 21, at 247.
67. Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1430 (1960 & Supps.).
68. Gardner, supra note 1, at 140-41.
69. Id. at 140 n.154.
70. This discussion will focus on self-defense as it operates in tort law in order
to avoid the difficulty of speaking about an individual's right in the criminal law context. See notes 22-25 supra &,accompanying text.
71. V is privileged only to the extent of preventing the assault. If he goes beyond
prevention, he is interfering with A's right not to be assaulted. See W. PROSSER, LAiW OF
TORTS § 19, 109-10 (4th ed. 1971).
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Of course A cannot defend against V's exercise of his privilege. The reason is not, however, that V has a concomitant right
to assault, but rather that A's so-called "defense" against V's retaliatory conduct is a continuation of his breach of the duty not to
assault V. A statement that A may not defend against V's justified
act would, therefore, be inaccurate.
Accordingly, -self-defense is not a persuasive analogy to the
necessity defense. In the latter, V has a right not to be assaulted
and A has a correlative duty not to assault V. With the justification provided by the necessity defense, however, A has the privilege to assault; that is, A is under no duty not to assault under
specified conditions. V, unlike A in the self-defense situation, is
an innocent person who has not violated a right. While the privilege for A means V has no right that A not assault him, the concomitant right of A to assault does not necessarily follow. 7 2 The

question of whether in cases of necessity the one against whom the
privilege is asserted must not interfere with the justified act should
be recognized as one of policy and separate from the doctrines
surrounding self-defense.
Over and above the self-defense analogy, the rationale behind
the necessity defense is that acts which can be brought under the
scope of the defense maximize social utility and thus are justifiable.
Professor Gardner feels that one should be under a duty not to
interfere with the maximization of social utility-the doing of the
justified act. Support for this claim can be found in a seminal article by Francis H. Bohlen on privileges to interfere with property:
[I]n the Law of Torts, an act which, if done under ordinary circumstances, would make the actor liable for invasions of another's

legally protected interests of which it is a legal cause, may be done
for certain purposes without liability for some or all of such invasions. And the fact that the act is done for certain of the purposes may and usually does have a further effect: the person whose
interests are threatened with invasion may lose his immunity from
liability for any harm done to the actor in resisting the threatened
invasion. Thus not only may the actor gain an immunity from
liability, but he may gain a right to invade the other's interest, resistance to which makes the other liable to him. 72

72. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
73. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of
Property and Personalty, 39 HARv. L. Rav. 307 (1927). See also id. at 316.
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However, it is submitted that this doctrine should not hold in the
same way for criminal as for civil justifications. Criminal justifications are tied to the notion of a defendant's guilt and culpable
conduct. Civil justifications are concerned with liability and determinations of how to allocate costs of the harm done. Society
may view criminal and civil justifications differently. Furthermore,
duties imposed by tort law may not be paralleled by duties imposed
by the criminal law. Therefore, it is not clear that one has an obligation under the criminal law to maximize social utility by not
interfering with a justified assault upon his person. 4
Lovercamp is an even stronger case since, unlike V, who had
a right not to be assaulted, prison guards are under a duty to prevent escapes. Professor Gardner's claim would set up contradictory
duties for the guards. Resolution of this contradiction would involve a further investigation of the maximization of social utility
and would not be governed by the maximization found to exist
for the privilege to escape.
3. The inmate is denied his right to confinement free from
sexual assault by the guards' privileged action to prevent the defendant's privileged escape.75
There are two separate correlative sets operating in this proposition, and no relationship between them is logically demanded.
Strictly speaking, the inmate's right that the state confine him free
from sexual assault is denied only if the state does not so confine
him. The issue is whether the prevention by the state of the inmate's escape is an interference with his right to confinement free
from sexual assault or whether that right is qualified by the state's
right that the prisoner not escape and the guards' duty and privilege to prevent escapes. To be sure, rights can be qualified by
74.

Indeed, Professor Bohlen qualified the doctrine to some extent even for tort

cases:
It is unlikely that one threatened with bodily harm will be held to be
deprived of his privilege to resist it because its infliction is obviously necessary to save the person attempting to inflict it from death or "serious" injury
merely because the threatened harm is not itself "serious." It is probable that
the privilege of resistance will be lost only when the bodily harm threatened
is out of all proportion small as compared with that which can only be prevented by its infliction [or where the personal injury is trivial and a property
injury is great].
Id. at 323-24. But see J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 434-35 (2d ed.

1960).
75. Gardner, supra note 1, at 141. "Tjhe right to incarceration free from sexual
assault ultimately depends on the defense of necessity." Id. at 125.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

other relationships. For example, one has a general right not to
be interfered with while spending one's money as one pleases.
This right, however, would be limited by duties placed on one
not knowingly to spend it to purchase stolen goods. A determination that the "right to escape" does not exist is not a denial of the
prisoner's right to be confined free from sexual assault. Rather, it
is a determination that the prisoner must seek redress for the violation of that right through the judicial process and not by way of
an unmanageable self-help remedy.
4. The public policy supporting civilized and humane treatment of inmates dictates that there be a right to escape under the
Lovercamp conditions.0
The inmate interests recognized under conceptions of civilized treatment and fundamental justice do not inevitably lead to
a right that the state not interfere with an escape in order to protect other prisoner rights, such as confinement by the state with
reasonable provisions for inmate safety and health. Once more,
a prisoner's self-help remedy should not be preferred over judicial
proceedings.
Professor Gardner is wrong when he reads Lovercamp as
affording a self-help remedy as a matter of fundamental justice.71
As a matter of fundamental justice and maximization of social
utility, Lovercamp furnished an affirmative defense-a privilege
which would be protected by a refusal of the court to convict. A
self-help remedy, on the other hand, would relate to affirmative
action by the court to vindicate the violation of a right. A violation of a right not to be interfered with in making an escape was
not an issue before the Lovercamp court and, thus, one would be
hard pressed to find a remedy flowing out of a case concerning
such a violation.
The argument that a court cannot countenance a prison system characterized by its inhumanity and, therefore, should recognize the right to escape78 is more of a plea to the courts to recog-

nize the right than an illustration that the right is a "ramification"
of the Lovercamp decision. Again, it must be stressed that the
existence of a right is not proved merely by showing the existence
of a privilege, even when the policy considerations for the privi76.

Gardner, supra note 1, at 142.

77. Id.
78. Id.
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lege furnish a strong reason for recognizing the right/duty correlative setJ 9 Ultimately, the recognition of a right is a new and
separate policy decision involving, among other things, the implications of "non-interference" and the soundness of providing prisoner self-help rather than improving existing judicial remedies.
Finally, an attempt to skirt this new policy judgment by saying that no state interests are compromised since they extend only
to lawful incarceration is misleading. While there is a strong policy
against incarceration under unlawful circumstances, there are also
substantial state interests against escapes.80 It is one thing for a
prisoner to have his incarceration declared illegal and to be set
free by operation of the law; it is another thing for the prisoner
to protect his rights by self-help in violation of the law against
escapes. The legitimate policies against escapes would still be compromised. Lovercamp's narrow privilege to escape under specified
conditions was considered to have a minimal impact on societal
interests while recognizing the individual's interest in personal
security."' The privilege, however, applies without regard to the
legality of the confinement.8 2 Therefore, the lawful/unlawful incarceration distinction is inapposite and confusing.
CONCLUSION

Professor Gardner's argument that a "right to escape" has
been created is unconvincing. Analyzing the Lovercamp case by
careful application of fundamental legal concepts resolves part of
the problem-it shows that the right alleged is not strictly implied
by the "logic" of the decision. 3 This is only a partial resolution,
however. The analysis presented in this Comment only serves to
expose the policy decisions that must be made.84 Future courts
will have to come to grips with the "hard case" and decide whether
a "right to escape" is to be added to the array of prisoners' rights.
79. Privileges of Labor Unions, supra note 57, at 789-90.
80. See note 7 supra.

81. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
82. The privilege means that the inmate has no duty not to escape from lawful
confinement. It is the negation of a duty of negative content and cannot be rephrased
as a privilege to escape from unlawful confinement.
83. Gardner, supra note 1, at 139. "[T]he difficulty is not so much in trying to
solve the problem 'merely by logic,' but in trying to solve it by false logic." Privileges of
Labor Unions, supra note 57, at 785.
84. See Brady, supra note 21, at 254-55.
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One can imagine that it will be more advantageous to litigate the
issue of inmate security (and the remedies for violation of the
rights involved) directly rather than by way of escape prosecutions.
The privilege itself may appear emaciated and worthless without the concomitant right; it does not offer much to the inmate
who is subject to sexual attacks. Still, the Lovercamp privilege
offers the same thing that all other privileges offer: protection from
another's claim upon the privilege-holder for a breach of a duty.
RODNEY

L. SCHERMER

